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Abstract
To avoid insider computer misuse, identity and authorization data referring to the legitimate users
of the systems must be properly organized and constantly and systematically analyzed and evaluated.
In order to support this, a methodology for structured Identity Management has been developed.
This methodology includes gathering of identity data spread among different applications, systematic
cleansing of user account data in order to detect semantic as well as syntactic errors, grouping of
privileges and access rights, and semiautomatic engineering of user roles. Each of the steps involved
includes quality criteria and comprehensive tool support. The focus of this paper is on the data
cleansing phase leading to feedback where insider misuse may occur due to existing privileges which
go beyond the scope of the users’ current need-to-know.
1 Introduction
Insider misuse of computing resources takes on a variety of forms. Looking at the problem at a first
glance, one might only think of the malicious insider who attempts to harm the organization or acts in a
purposeful way that threatens the organization’s interests. Sometimes, nevertheless, there is a fine line
between malicious intent and mere misuse. Insider misuse does not necessarily need to be malicious
to pose a threat to the organization. For example, consider an employee downloading music or video
to a desktop computer would not usually be doing so with intent to harm the organization. However,
if the files being downloaded are pirated or if a peer-to-peer file-sharing program is used, the employee
is putting the organization at risk or may even through the P2P-software inadvertently give outsiders
access to confidential files stored on the computer. Additionally, of course, there is also the insider who
accidentally misuses the system because of wrong use or an error.
To summarize, there is no general way of IT misuse by insiders. We are confronted with a range of
potential scenarios. Insiders commonly act by using their own user accounts and perform within the range
of their assigned privileges and access rights but abuse their current job functions, which became possible
because of inadequate authorizations. It such an environment the misuse might remain undetected and
invisible because current detection methods mainly rely on rule-breaking behavior which would not be
the case here. In 2006, Cappelli et al. investigated this problem and possible ways of solving it in [2].
According to a recent survey conducted by the American Society for Industrial Security 1, current and
former employees and on-site contractors with authorized access to facilities and networks pose the most
significant risk to intellectual property, such as research data, customer files, and financial information.
In general, employees are over-authorized causing a high threat to IT misuse by insiders. During their
lifetime in the organization employees are not statically assigned to a certain job but migrate between
different job functions and assignments. Each change implies new duties and responsibilities which often
go along with new and additional access privileges to the IT resources. Over the time, most employees
mainly acquire access rights which only very rarely are dispensed later even when they are no longer
1http://www.asisonline.org/
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needed. An additional risk arises from the fact that identity and authorization data is usually spread
among several applications (identity silos) and in the case an employee leaves the organization is not
completely deleted from all the directory systems. The situation described above is sometimes referred
to as the so called ”identity chaos”. The term describes a situation in which users have multiple identities,
passwords and accounts spread across a variety of security domains (networks, applications, computers
and/or computing devices). To further complicate matters, each security domain may be subject to
different rules, allow access to different security levels and passwords and accounts may expire after a
certain time or may not expire at all. Given these factors, it is not surprising that the Aberdeen Group 2
states that only 17 percent of companies claim they do not have orphaned accounts (accounts with access
that should have been revoked). Some organizations take more than 30 days to decommission accounts
and others have no defined processes for decommissioning nor means to discover if orphaned accounts
even exist.
Related to preventing insider misuse is the aspect of evaluating the compliance of IT with laws and
regulations. Under this umbrella, organizations are increasingly forced to control, manage and audit their
Identity Management processes. Among the most known drivers are the U.S. Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX)
of 2002 [11, 13], Basel II [4], the German BSI Grundschutz [3], the Directive 95/46/EC of the European
Parliament [12], ISO IT Security standards (such as ISO 27002), and own regulations large organizations
use for their internal audits.
This paper is concerned with the risk of system misuse by over-authorized insiders to whom the
capability of accessing one or many components of the IT system has been legitimately given. In order
to fight the identity chaos and the risk of insider misuse which comes along we propose a methodology
for structured Identity Management consisting of (a) gathering of identity data spread among different
security domains, (b) systematic cleansing of identity and account data in order to increase their quality
and detect orphaned accounts, (c) grouping of privileges and access rights based on job functions and
organizational structure, and (d) semiautomatic engineering of user roles. We give a general overview of
the methodology but have a focus on the data cleansing and detection of the orphaned accounts phases.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 contains the general overview, section 3 has a focus on
data cleansing and section 4 contains the evaluation of our methodology by performing a case study with
account data of a real company. Section 5 contains the conclusion and future work.
2 General Overview of contROLE
ContROLE is a methodology and corresponding tool set supporting a structured Identity Management
process. The process consists of six different phases (see Figure 1) which roughly can be grouped into
three major functional units. Early phases are concerned with gathering identity and account informa-
tion as well as information about the organizational structure of the enterprise. It is followed by data
cleansing, aiming at detecting inconsistencies, syntactic and semantic errors and orphaned accounts. Fi-
nal phases are concerned with mining and grouping access characteristics, relating them to typical job
functions and with suggesting user roles which may serve as basis for role-based access controls. The
methodology may be applied as a whole (leading to a role catalog) or only partly, for example, data
cleansing process steps only.
Applying the methodology has high potential for reducing the risk of insider misuse. The earlier
phases help to get a better understanding where identity and account data is spread in the organization
and in what aspect security policies in different domains differ. Making security officers and CIOs aware
of this is an important part of mitigating the risk of insider misuse. Analyzing and cleansing of existing
2Aberdeen Group, Identity and Access Management Critical to Operations and Security, March 2007; Copyright c©2007,
Aberdeen Group
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identity and account data is central to reducing the risk. It significantly contributes to increasing the
quality of identity and account information by pointing to syntactic and semantic errors in directories,
orphaned accounts, or existing privileges which might not be necessary to perform the job. Also struc-
turing the user population according to typical user roles has significant benefit to hinder insider misuse.
Users may be assigned to certain roles but in a particular point in time may only play one role. Playing
the role will restrict them to only those privileges and accounts which are necessary to perform the job
functions corresponding to the role.
Some more information about contROLE can be collected at www.nexis-secure.com. Different as-
pects of the methodology are already published, i.e. the general process of in-house Identity Management
[1], tool support for structured Identity Management [5], and the process of semi-automated generation
of roles [6]. The following is a short description of each of the contROLE process steps (see Figure 1).
Cleansing of identity and account data as the major aspect of preventing insider misuse will be described
in more detail in Section 3 of this paper.
Figure 1: Structured Identity Management process according to contROLE
Data Gathering is concerned with the compilation of a consistent information repository representing
the basis for further data cleansing, data preparation, and role development. Identity and account infor-
mation can be spread over several security domains and hidden in LDAP directories, meta-directories,
authorization lists and tables or embedded within different applications. Besides the mandatory identity
information, data from the organizational structure of the enterprise is optional but highly desired. It
might be available in forms of defined job positions, task bundles, or already existing local role defini-
tions within certain departments.
After input data has been cleansed (see Section 3), the process moves on to Data Preparation and
Selection. In order to arrive at a suitable role catalogue, it is mandatory to allow choosing the users, rights,
and/or organizational units to be included in the role development process. During this phase contROLE
develops several parameters which offer a first feedback whether proper input data is available so that
role development might be successful. Examples of parameters are number of privileges held only by
a small number of users, comparison of different departments, amount of cleansed input data, or even
more complex such as the grade of interdependencies between hierarchical elements in the organization.
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In the case feedback is not sufficient the methodology suggests revising the earlier process steps. Phases
4-6 are devoted to the actual Role Development. The outcome is a set of roles of a certain type: Basic
roles bundle common access privileges within organizational elements, organizational roles represent job
positions while functional roles represent common task bundles of employees. The roles are stepwise
derived, coming from more general ones, such as basic roles to very specific ones, such as functional
roles. The methodology supports iterative role development through integration of role mining and
role engineering in various loops. While mining is concerned with analyzing patterns in user account
information, role engineering follows a top-down approach and considers input data concerning the
organizational structure of the enterprise.
3 Cleansing Identity and Account Data
Analyzing and cleansing of existing identity and account data is central to reducing the risk of insider
misuse. From the previous phase contROLE assumes the existence of a central information repository
built from existing identity and account data as well as data concerning the organizational structure of
the enterprise. As usual with many types of real-world data [14] identity and account information also
tends to be incomplete, noisy, and inconsistent. The main goal of this phase is to increase the data
quality, detect errors and inconsistencies, orphaned accounts, or authorizations which go beyond to what
the employee needs to know to perform his work. Syntactic checks aim at revealing errors regarding
the input data entities while semantic checks try to identify inconsistencies in the relationships among
those entities. While syntactic checks might be fully automatable, semantic checks cannot be processed
without human intervention. Therefore results need to be visualized appropriately and be sent to a domain
expert for approval. After errors have been detected and cleansed, the updated data is written back to the
originating sources.
3.1 Syntactic analysis of identity and account data
Syntactic analysis follows the process described in Figure 2 (light grey shading represents optional tasks).
It aims to detect invalid data like misspelled attribute values, duplicate or similar datasets, incomplete
datasets with missing- or null-values, and violations of referential integrity constraints.
Figure 2: contROLE process steps for syntactic analysis
Consistency check. In the case valid value lists have been provided a consistency check can optionally
be carried out to ensure the correctness of the datasets corresponding to the employees, permissions, and
hierarchy elements of the organization. Actual values which are not included in the valid value lists are
highlighted. The consistency check includes a distance metric similar to the Levenshtein distance [8] in
order to propose a valid value for an erroneous entry. As an example consider a misspelled name of an
employee. Instead of deleting the respective dataset the correct employee name should be proposed. In
the case no correct value can be proposed (if the entry analyzed does not have any semantic meaning, for
instance, abbreviated organizational unit names), the consistency check by default assigns a null-value,
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marking the respective datasets for further investigation. The same holds for predefined null-values
included in the valid value lists.
Duplicate and similarity check. The duplicate check identifies identical datasets while the similarity
check reveals misspellings. The latter is commonly applied in case the consistency check has been
skipped. Again, distance metrics are used for the detection of errors and the proposal of correct values
for misspelled datasets.
Missing value check. The check for missing values reveals incomplete datasets. Depending on the
general policy, these datasets could be deleted. More likely, however, the missing values are replaced
with a valid null-value. This allows for the later treatment during the semantic cleansing.
Referential integrity check. Referential integrity checks investigate the relationships among the
datasets. Depending on predefined policies, several restrictions could exist, for example the policy that
every employee needs to be assigned to exactly one component within at least one hierarchy type of the
organization. In the case empty assignments are determined the dataset is marked for further handling
during the semantic checks or manual validation by a domain expert.
3.2 Semantic analysis of identity and account data
In addition to the syntactic checks, contROLE provides further functionality for semantic analysis of
the input data. Focusing on the relationship between permissions, employees, and organizational hier-
archy elements, semantic error detection is used to detect (a) employees with authorizations which do
not match their job functions (for example, over-authorized employees), employees with atypically as-
signed permissions or attributes, employees with valid but incorrectly assigned attribute values and (b)
permissions no longer in use but still assigned to employees and permissions used by nearly all em-
ployees within an organizational unit. We call type (a) ”employee outliers” and type (b) ”permission
outliers”. Semantic analysis also follows a process model which is described in Figure 3. While the
permission outlier checks reveal potentially erroneous user-permission assignments for deletion, the em-
ployee outlier checks highlight attribute values of employees which might be subject to re-assignment.
Technologies used by the contROLE toolset to identify semantic errors are statistical analysis, cluster-
ing, mining and artificial neural networks. In order to explain a semantic error to the domain expert data
needs not only be analyzed but also properly visualized. For detecting employee outliers we have very
good experiences with self-organizing maps (SOMs) as proposed by Kohonen [7]. Before the detection
can be conducted, the underlying SOMs have to be parameterized and trained. For example, identity
and account information from a specific element of the organizational hierarchy or even the whole input
dataset can be selected for investigation. During training, the SOM groups employees according to the
similarity of their assigned permissions. Similar users are located close to each other whereby employees
with different access rights are located on different parts of the map. A typical classifier often selected is
the attribute used to assign an employee to an organizational unit.
Detect employee outliers
The first type of semantic checks focuses on the detection of identity and account data of employees with
atypically assigned permissions or attributes. contROLE is able to detect the following outliers: Wrong
user attribute values, null-values in accounts, wrong permission assignments. It also suggests correct
attribute values for the detected datasets and passes this information for manual inspection to a domain
expert. In selected cases errors might also be cleansed without any human interaction. As an example to
illustrate how detection of employee outliers and attribute cleansing work by using SOMs consider Figure
4. The example gives part of a SOM used to classify identity and account information of employees
based on the attribute ”assignment to organizational hierarchy element (OHE)”, i.e. every employee is
5
Ludwig Fuchs and Gu¨nther Pernul
Figure 3: contROLE process steps for semantic analysis
classified according to his aggregated hierarchy level (HL) assignment. Consider the employees Trent
Klein and Max Strasser. Assume both employees have been re-assigned to the Support department (blue
colored). Max Strasser’s old access privileges from the Infrastructure department (green colored) have
been correctly de-provisioned. However, his departmental attribute has not been changed. He therefore is
visualized as outlier within a group of Support department employees. On the contrary, Trent Klein’s old
access privileges have not been revoked and his OHE assignment has not been updated yet. Trent thus is
located in between the green and blue employee groups. Additionally, every null-value is considered to
be an outlier (see yellow colored pie charts in Figure 4).
After detection, it needs to be decided about treatment of the candidate errors. For proposing a
correct attribute value, contROLE analyses all identity and account data located on a suspicious node
and its direct neighborhood (NL-1) and selects the element with the highest similarity to the identified
outlier. The non-aggregated class information of this user is proposed as correct value. In the example
above Max Strasser has been identified as a member of the Support department (hierarchy level HL-1). If
this OHE has five sub-departments, Max Strasser could potentially be assigned to either of them. Thus, in
the example the employees assigned to the same node and the employees located on the three surrounding
nodes are analyzed for their similarity to Max Strasser. In case the winner unit is assigned to a Support
Billing department (HL-2), this value is proposed as correct value for OHE of Max Strasser. Note that
in several cases automatic re-assignment of the respective attribute value is possible, for example, in the
case of null-values. However, the integration of domain expert knowledge in order to optimize the results
is highly recommended.
Detect permission outliers
The second type of semantic checks deals with outliers concerning the distribution of single permissions
among the hierarchy elements of the organization, carried out by a (a) rare permission check and the
inverse (b) common permission check. Both checks are split into a detection and refinement phase.
After the initial detection of possible outliers a cross-checking reduces the amount of outliers that are
communicated to domain experts without actually being an error (false-positive rate). As an example,
Figure 5 visualizes the candidate permission outliers detected by both checks for a hierarchy unit with
500 users.
A rare permission is defined as an access privilege that is only assigned up to a certain percentage of
employees within the organization (lower bound parameter). In the example above three permissions are
marked as rare permissions (12, 3, and 89). These permissions could be local or individual permissions
needed for specialist tasks. However, they could likewise be no longer in use but have not been de-
provisioned correctly or orphaned accounts referring to employees who may not work in the company
any more. Therefore a refinement step investigates every organizational unit with at least one employee
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Figure 4: Employee outlier detection using SOMs
Figure 5: Rare permission and common permission detection
assigned to a suspicious permission. The percentage of employees assigned to the respective permission
in these hierarchy elements needs to be below a predefined threshold in order to mark the dataset as
outlier. Figure 6 illustrates the refinement of the candidate outlier permissions 3 and 12 from the example
above. Permission 3 is assigned to 10 employees (2% of 500 employees). It is exclusively used in the
Development department (10 employees).
Thus permission 3 is likely no outlier but related to specialist tasks. In contrast, the lower part of
the picture shows the cross-checking of permission 12 which is assigned to 3 employees spread across
the whole organization. This permission thus might be considered as an outlier that needs to be further
investigated by a domain expert.
The common permission check is somehow reverse to the rare permission check. It investigates
permissions that are assigned to a very high percentage of the employees (permissions 22, 6, and 9
in the example in Figure 5). The goal is to identify missing user-permission assignments. The most
critical stage in applying both aforementioned checks is the parameterization of the bounds for detecting
potential errors as well as the refinement threshold. One indicator could be the average number of
employees per investigated organizational unit in case of a low standard deviation. The same holds for
the refinement threshold which could be defined on the basis of the average employee numbers in the
different departments. In order to cleanse the semantic errors and the potentially unresolved syntactic
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Figure 6: Permission outlier refinement
errors, the results have to be sent for review to a human domain expert. The errors are bundled according
to elements of the organizational hierarchy and users together with the proposed correct values. The
domain expert can then accept this proposal or alter the data. After the errors have been iteratively
resolved and cleansed, the reconciliation flow to the target systems takes place. By exposing the correct
input data elements to the productive systems in place, the quality of the identity and account data has
been advanced and the risks for security breaches and system misuse by insiders has been considerably
minimized in a timely manner. In general, applying syntactic and semantic cleansing of identity and
account data has high potential for reducing the risk of insider misuse. It significantly contributes to
increasing the quality of identity and account information by pointing to errors in directories, outdated
privileges, orphaned accounts, or existing privileges which might not be necessary to perform the job.
Analyzing and cleansing account information is also a prerequisite for structuring the user population
according to typical user roles. Having proper knowledge of potential roles is rudimental for role-based
access controls [10], which also has significant benefit to hinder insider misuse.
4 Case Study
After the data cleansing mechanisms applied during the execution of contROLE have been presented, the
paper continues with their evaluation in a naturalistic application scenario, using a large, complex, and
potentially erroneous dataset.
4.1 Data gathering
The input data used (from hereinafter called Access Controls following the terminology of Molloy et al.
[9]) originate from the Identity Management repository (Microsoft Active Directory) of a large indus-
trial organization. The company, from hereinafter called SemiC, operates worldwide with about 30000
employees. For this application scenario the Active Directory domain Asia-Pacific including 8115 em-
ployees and their memberships in 7533 different groups is provided. In the following, every group is
treated as permission. The SemiC Access Controls include the employees, their assigned department,
location and the group memberships (see extract in Listing 1).
Table 1 sums up the relevant statistics for the provided Access Controls. During the initial data import
the duplicate check has been executed and duplicate datasets already have been excluded reducing the
UPA (user-permission assignments) from 151062 to 150329.
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Accountname;Location;Department;Permission
rorZ0cBq0rc5U;Singapore;SCAP OP SC MIT IN FAB;CN=SIN -OU-Users -G
roN1w2ZAbwwVg;Malacca;SCMY IT;CN=AP-SemiCEmployees -G
roN1w2ZAbwwVg;Malacca;SCMY IT;CN=MKZ -OU-Users -G
roECnrbpybF0w;unspecified;SCWU IT MFG;CN=AP-SemiCEmployees -G
roECnrbpybF0w;unspecified;SCWU IT MFG;CN=WUX -ITCoordinator -G
roECnrbpybF0w;unspecified;SCWU IT MFG;CN=WUX -FAB -Standard -Users -G
row6reFFa8y7o;Singapore;SCAP IT CBS HR;CN=SeC -Employees -SG-U
[...]
Listing 1: Access Controls extract SemiC
Access Controls element Total
Employees 8115
Permissions 7533
Hierarchy elements 1527 (1486 line-, 41 geographic hierarchy)
UPA 151062 (after import 150329)
Table 1: Access Controls statistics SemiC
4.2 Syntactic data cleansing
Executing the similarity checks introduced earlier is not reasonable as the employee names are ran-
dom strings and the organizational unit names are abbreviations. Only for the location attribute can
suggestions according to the Levenshtein distance [8] be made. Additionally, all missing location and
department values of users have been set to the valid null-value UNSPECIFIED for further investigation
(missing value check). In our given scenario a list of valid organizational units for the line- and the geo-
graphic hierarchy has been provided. Thus, the departments included in the Access Controls have been
compared with these values. Checking the consistency of the line organization marked 263 out of 1486
hierarchy elements as invalid. One reason for this high number might be the large amount of organi-
zational restructuring within SemiC which took place over the last few years. Old organizational units
might not have been de-provisioned correctly and thus still exist in the Active Directory environment,
possibly resulting in insider abuse of information systems.
Besides the line organization, the consistency of the geographic structure of SemiC has been ana-
lyzed (see Figure 7). Several datasets with a location value from other regions than Asia are identified
together with cryptically named locations. The related datasets (12 employees, 238 UPA) might represent
accounts of employees that have been re-assigned to a new site while their location attribute has not been
updated. Thus, the null-value UNSPECIFIED is assigned to affected employees and the related UPA
are further investigated during the semantic data analysis. Secondly, several datasets with a misspelled
location attribute have been revealed. contROLE proposes a correct value from the list of valid values
(e.g. Xi’an instead of Xian; Levenshtein distance 1.0). Further analysis of this typing mistake reveals that
ten employees are assigned to the misspelled location Xian while 300 employees are assigned to Xi’an.
Thus, the erroneous location can automatically be renamed.
Effects of the syntactic data cleansing efforts
Syntactic data checking revealed that a total of 263 out of 1486 organizational units in the line organiza-
tion and 15 out of 41 OHE in the geographical hierarchy have been identified as erroneous. Carrying out
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Figure 7: contROLE consistency check results
the referential integrity check revealed 32 employees with two or more assigned hierarchy elements of
the same OHE type. This small number of violations might be the result of previous consolidation efforts
of the IdM team within SemiC. In total the previous syntactic data cleansing efforts reduced the number
of UPA included in the Access Controls from 150329 to 146584 and the total number of employees from
8115 to 7576. In terms of insider threat the results show a large number of active user accounts with
invalid attribute assignments. The related access rights represent major security holes for insider attacks.
4.3 Semantic data cleansing
Identify employee outliers
Employee outlier detection is carried out for the pre-cleansed dataset on the basis of a semi-automatic
SOM analysis. ContROLE parses trained SOMs and stores potential outliers in a database table together
with the node coordinates. Figure 8 presents the SOM visualisation of the geographic hierarchy of SemiC
3. It can be seen that employees working in the same locations are in general clustered and located near to
each other (same coloring). However, areas where users from different locations are located close to each
other are also visible (centre part of Figure 8). These areas either hint at permission bundles (and thus
roles) that are valid throughout several locations or could represent erroneous data elements. For deciding
about which of the employees are considered as potential outliers for attribute value re-assignment, our
tool allows for different threshold levels during the analysis steps. In the given example, error detection
and data cleansing is carried out within seven iterations, using the manual map investigation and industry
partner feedback as abort criteria. During the first iteration nodes with more than 75%, but less than
3Note that the lattice numbers are only partly visible as they are overlaid by the pie charts. The depicted map, however,
visualizes all 7576 remaining employees in the input data.
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100% of the node members being assigned to the predominant node-class are marked as outliers. The
refinement step validates whether their first neighborhood level is also dominated by the same class
by more than 75%. If this condition is true the node is cleansed. During the consecutive iterations
these threshold values are adapted based on the manual map investigation in order to identify remaining
outliers. The last iteration involves a manual selection of suspicious datasets not identified previously.
Figure 8: SOM analysis of the SemiC geographical hierarchy
Focusing on the upper left part of Figure 8, Figure 9 shows the effects of the aforementioned cleans-
ing process. On the left side several outliers with the location attribute Singapore (light grey colouring)
are depicted in the group of users working in Kulim (dark grey colouring). contROLE thus extracts these
datasets and proposes Kulim as correct location attribute value. Remember that such employees with
wrongly assigned location attributes negatively influence the consecutive role development process. Ad-
ditionally, note that the cleansing process described requires human interaction in order to finally decide
if a suspicious dataset is erroneous or not. contROLE allows for the integration of business know-how
for acquiring high-quality results.
The employee outlier detection described above resulted in a total of 340 attribute re-assignments for
the remaining 7576 employees for the geographic hierarchy. The same process carried out for the line
organization resulted in 153 attribute re-assignments to the proposed correct value.
Identify permission outliers
Subsequent to the employee outlier detection the common permission analysis reveals potentially missing
UPA. Executing it with the exemplary upper bound of 0.95 (line organization) resulted in 175 UPA of this
type. contROLE suggests sending those potential outliers to the respective domain experts for approval.
The contROLE rare permission check is executed for the 16 provided level-1 line organization de-
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Figure 9: Employee outlier cleansing with contROLE (erroneous vs. cleansed data)
partments in order to reveal permissions which are likely to be no longer needed but existing due to
incorrect de-provisioning processes. At first, the respective threshold needs to be thoroughly set. If
5% or less of the employees within a level-1 department, e.g., are assigned to a certain permission, the
check considers 43630 of the remaining 146759 UPA (29.7%) suspicious. However, in order to minimize
the false positive rate the restrictive bound of 0.01 has been used in the following, highlighting 20288
potentially erroneous UPA (13.8% of the total UPA).
Consecutively, the refinement loop excludes UPA assigned to more than a certain percentage of the
employees within a non-aggregated department. Figure 10 depicts the percentage of the 20288 suspicious
UPA considered erroneous after the refinement loop (blue coloring) in relation to the excluded UPA (grey
coloring) depending on the used refinement threshold. It can be seen that a high refinement parameter
leads to all 20288 suspicious datasets being considered erroneous while a low parameter excludes a high
percentage of them from further investigation. During our evaluation process a restrictive refinement
parameter of 0.1 was applied in the following in order to minimize the false-positive rate (5852 candidate
errors).
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Figure 10: Rare permission check refinement results
4.4 Data cleansing impact
This section briefly sums up the impact of the data cleansing efforts for reducing insider misuse, ret-
rospectively underlining the importance of this contROLE phase. Overall, an average reduction of the
input data elements within the SemiC Access Controls of about 12.75% has been achieved. The result
refinement in Table 2 shows that the number of permissions even could be reduced by 18.31%. This
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underlines the large number of potentially outdated but still accessible permissions within the provided
input data. The results moreover underline that the high reduction of permissions only has little impact
on the existing UPA as most excluded permissions are individual permissions. Note that these statis-
tics to not depict the numerous re-assignments of attribute values carried out during the semantic data
cleansing.
Access Controls element Raw input After cleansing Reduction
Employees 8115 7576 6.64%
Permissions 7533 6154 18.31%
Hierarchy elements 1527 1232 19.32%
UPA 151062 140907 6.72%
Table 2: Data cleansing impacts on the SemiC identity data
5 Conclusion and Future Work
During their lifetime in the organization, employees usually develop a personal career and migrate be-
tween different jobs and assignments. Each change implies new duties and responsibilities which in
general come along with new and additional obligations and access privileges. Over the time, access
rights are mainly acquired and only rarely dispensed later even when they are no longer needed. As a
consequence, many users possess more access privileges than are necessary to perform their actual job,
permissions exist which are not used anymore, or accounts are still valid for which users already have
left the organization. This situation is a risk to the threat of insider IT misuse because in most cases mis-
use takes place by insiders using their own user accounts and performing within the range of the totality
of currently assigned privileges. Because detection methods mainly rely on rule-breaking behavior, this
type of misuse is very difficult to detect. Making security officers and CIOs aware of these threats is an
important part of mitigating the risk of insider misuse.
This paper dealt with the risk of system misuse due to bad quality of the identity and account data.
In order to encounter the related risk of insider misuse, we proposed the methodology contROLE for
structured Identity Management including a systematic cleansing of account data. It was shown that
cleansing of identity and account data results in a considerable increase of data quality. User accounts
and permissions which did not reflect the current job function of the employees, orphaned accounts,
inconsistencies and errors and permissions no longer needed could be detected and resolved. We gave a
general overview of the methodology, background information on the cleansing algorithms we are using
and a report about the results gathered from a real-life application case.
For future work we are currently developing and evaluating additional semantic data cleansing checks
which aim at identifying employees and departments with untypical and excessive permissions assigned
in specific departments. In contrast to the currently existing contROLE data cleansing mechanisms, these
checks investigate non-aggregated user and departmental data and examine the permission assignments
within single organizational hierarchy elements.
5.1 Acknowledgments
The tool supporting the presented methodology uses on an open-source implementation of SOMs devel-
oped in the SOMLib Digital Library Project by the Information & Software Engineering Group at the
Vienna University of Technology.
13
Ludwig Fuchs and Gu¨nther Pernul
References
[1] L. Pernul G. Broser, C. Fuchs. Different Approaches to in-house Identity Management. In Proc of the 4th Int.
Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security (ARES), Fukuoka, Japan, 2009. IEEE Computer Society.
[2] D. Cappelli, A. Moore, T. Shimeall, and R. Trzeciak. Common Sense Guide to Prevention and Detection of
Insider Threats. Technical report, Carnegie Mellon University Cylab, 2006.
[3] Federal Office for Information Security (BSI):. IT-Grundschutz. Available:
http://www.bsi.bund.de/english/gshb/index.htm, 2004.
[4] Bank for International Settlements BIS. Basel II: International Convergence of Capital Mea-
surement and Capital Standards: A Revised Framework - Comprehensive Version. Available:
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs128.pdf, 2006.
[5] C. Fuchs, L. Mueller. Automating Periodic Role-Checks: A Tool-based Approach. In Proc. Business Ser-
vices: Konzepte, Technologien, Anwendungen. 9. Internationale Tagung Wirtschaftsinformatik., Vienna, Aus-
tria, 2009.
[6] G. Fuchs, L. Pernul. HyDRo - Hybrid Development of Roles. In Proc. 4th Int. Conf. on Information Systems
Security (ICISS), Hyderabad, India, LNCS 5352, Berlin, Germany, 2008. Springer.
[7] Teuvo Kohonen. Self-organized formation of topologically correct feature maps. Biological Cybernetics,
43(1):59–69, 1982.
[8] V. I. Levenshtein. Binary Codes Capable of Correcting Deletions, Insertions and Reversals. Doklady
Akademii Nauk SSSR 163, 163(4):845–848, 1965.
[9] I. Molloy, H. Chen, T. LI, Q. Wang, N. LI, E. Bertino, S.B. Calo, and J. Lobo. Mining Roles with Semantic
Meanings. In Proc. of the 13th ACM Symposium on Access Control Models and Technologies (SACMAT),
pages 21–30, Estes Park, CO, USA, 2008.
[10] Ravi S. Sandhu, Edward J. Coyne, Hal L. Feinstein, and Charles E. Youman. Role-Based Access Control
Models. IEEE Computer, 19(2):38–47, 1996.
[11] P. S. Sarbanes. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745). Available:
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=107 cong bills&docid=f:h3763enr.tst.pdf,
2002.
[12] European Union. Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council. Official
Journal of the European Communities of 23th November 1995 No L. 281 p. 31. Available:
http://www.cdt.org/privacy/eudirective/EU Directive .html, 1995.
[13] L. Volino, G. H. Gessner, and G. F. Kermis. Sarbanes-Oxley Links IT to Corporate Compliance. In Proc. of
the 10th Americas Conference on Information Systems, New York, 2004.
[14] Xingquan Zhu and Xindong Wu. Class Noise vs. Attribute Noise: A Quantitative Study of their Impacts.
Artificial Intelligence Review, 22(3):177–210, 2004.
14
